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age. Atomic culture is a term generally used to describe American popular culture surrounding the nuclear tests in the desert of the south-western United States during the 1950s. The mushroom cloud of the atomic era was a symbol of modern science and knowledge, power, and prosperity. This optimistic portrayal of nuclear innovation however stimulated fears concerning the destructive capacity associated with scientific technology which the media and government often used to their advantage by motivating civilians through controlled anxiety. The presence of the bomb in postwar society is not typically recognised as a Canadian Cold War experience except in terms of American cultural influence. The significance of Operation "Lifesaver" in Canadian history, therefore, is its demonstration of the nature of the Canadian Cold War experience in terms of the planers' solicitation of controlled anxiety to the civilians.
Operation "Lifesaver's" embodiment of atomic culture is evident through an examination of the planners' intentions, the project's portrayal, and the presentation of the operation's apparent success. Although presented to the civilian as a scientific experiment, the importance of Operation "Lifesaver" lay not within the civilian's impression of the exercise nor the practical value of an evacuation, but in the exercise's process, the official report's rhetoric, the topics of discussion between planners, and the prominent factor of aesthetics in the exercise itself. Based on the planning procedures, the general motivation behind the evacuation was propaganda and the effort to engage civilians and legitimize the civil defence exercise. disaster, are deeply implicated in performance, pretense, and scripted pretexts."
1
The Operation "Lifesaver" "performance"
was a controlled scenario presented to a relatively apathetic public as a scientific experiment. The exercise was one of the primary pieces of concrete evidence demonstrating Canada's inclusion in the atomic age.
Operation "Lifesaver" was, more than anything, an effort to prove to Calgarians, Canadians, and the world at large, that western civilians could survive a nuclear attack. There are a number of possibilities as to why Calgary hosted the major civil defence exercise of Canada at this time. Calgary was the largest city in southern Alberta and, most importantly, a strategic location for oil and gas production, and an important centre for wheat distribution and meat packing. 2 It was also "the Canadian gateway to rail traffic through the Rockies."
3
Calgary was therefore considered a logistical target. But throughout the 1950s, and at the time of the exercise, Calgary was considered merely a secondary target. Another possibility of Operation "Lifesaver's" chosen location, therefore, could have been because the city was able to afford the production, planning, and execution of a major evacuation exercise. Finally, the most important aspect of the choice for Calgary was that it was an easy city to evacuate. Situated in the southern part of the province, surrounded by prairies, the city had numerous natural and unchallenged exits. The towns surrounding the city were also The two Mutual Aid Areas were apparently a combined effort of communities to help the situation in Edmonton which was, judging from the layout of the plan, dire. As the province's capital city, and as a strategic bomb target, Edmonton was the primary focus of the theoretical attack.
The rest of the exercise was built around the plight of Edmonton and the duties of the rest of the province to keep the capital city functional. The Mutual Aid Areas were to provide the capital city with rescue facilities, equipment and supplies, utility and works projects, auxiliary officers, and firefighters. 9 The headquarters for the experiment provided the fifteen municipalities each with a scenario concerning damages inflicted on their respective areas.
The community representatives would then have to devise a civil defence and post-attack reconstruction plan to deal with the disaster by the close of the exercise.
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The 
Sci entific Method and Preparation for the Experiment:
Operation "Lifesaver" was a scientific experiment in many ways;
it featured a method, subjects and materials to be used in the test, and expected results. And, like a scientific experiment, the exercise followed the universal steps of an investigation: first, the formulation of a hypothesis: if Calgary residents leave Calgary in an orderly fashion, they will save themselves from a nuclear attack; second, a selected research method and design study:
observation of the evacuation through film and data; collection | 57
and analysis of the "empirical evidence": compiled mainly by the media and the ACDHQ; and a report depicting the findings.
The Central Mutual Aid Area (CMAA), the area selected by the ACDHQ, was primarily a suburban section of the city and it featured well organized routes which would be easily traversed in the event of an emergency. The decision to use the population from this area of the city had many benefits which, although not openly discussed by the planning committee, were most likely behind the selection of the north-eastern section of Calgary. The suburb, as opposed to the inner city, was easy to evacuate, but there was also the issue of residents. The suburb housed the middle-class citizens, those most likely to cooperate in an organised evacuation and, most importantly, have the means of transportation to participate in an evacuation. Driving through
the organized and open streets of suburbia, the residents of the north-eastern section of Calgary were expected to complete a clean and well-ordered exit while the rest of the nation watched.
The north-east section of Calgary, as depicted in the map below, was divided into twenty-one zones for the course of Operation Lifesaver.
Report on Operation Lifesaver, "Appendix," 26.
The residents of each zone were issued directions to a different receiving community outside of the city. These routes and communities were colour coded and corresponded to the location of the evacuee's neighbourhood. The participants of the exercise, as is wont with subjects of most scientific experiments, were to be | 59
reimbursed for their troubles: they were paid for the day missed from work and "insurance coverage was arranged for participants who might get in a car accident or sustain property damage during the exercise."
20
Even prior to the experiment, the ACDHQ studied its subjects with a series of questionnaires. Although participation to the exercise appears to have been voluntary on the part of the civilian the selection process conducted through the questionnaires apparently focussed on achieving a particularly cooperative group that would be enable for a smooth display of civil preparedness. The intent of the tests was not entirely clear; the tests could have been designed to benefit the exercise by providing the planners with information to be extrapolated in a real life event but they could have also been designed to make the exercise run more smoothly through a selection of capable, mobile, and willing individuals. Along with the extensive information regarding the destination points of the exercise, the Operation "Lifesaver" coordinators also questioned residents about their family status and on their abilities to travel. In one specific questionnaire, sent months prior to the exercise, the ACDHQ obtained information concerning the number of members within the participating families, the number who were at home during the day, and the ages of the children of the family. | 61
freedom to put in their backyards, was in fact just as capitalist in practice. In the era of the individual and capitalism, to consume was to survive; a family car and a full tank of gas could spell safety from attack and there was no need to depend on anyone else. And so the exercise had its choice of participants, suburban civilians who would complete a well-ordered exit from the city.
The motivation tactics of the exercise moved away from the comfort of the suburb and into the terrifying possibilities of nuclear warfare through the application of controlled anxiety.
In warned Calgarians that they were not invulnerable from an attack.
The Herald editorial the day before the exercise proclaimed it "the plain duty of every responsible citizen to co-operate as fully as possible.
23
The notice also included brief references to the possibility of a hydrogen bomb dropping on Calgary:
The Federal Government -with all the very latest intelligence reports in its possession -is satisfied that, if war ever comes, the "H" Bomb will be used. (You and I may have our own ideas about this -but I think we have got to admit that, based as they probably are on nothing better than wishful thinking, they are not worth a great deal.) You and I, therefore, have just two choices -and as this is a free country -we may take which one of them we fancy and no one can force us to do otherwise. We can stay in the target area and die -or we can evacuate ourselves and live. It must be one or the other -and the choice is in our hands.
25
The warning clearly defined what was apparently common sense:
there was going to be a nuclear war and the best way to avoid getting killed was to evacuate the city when the siren rang. The statement was almost too simplistic in nature to be manipulative, particularly with its blatant reference to the free western world:
"this is a free country." Perhaps this message was not so much a fear tactic as an attempt to cast civil defence as a natural response to the global issues at hand and the attractive qualities of
participating in the evacuation exercise. The message was also personal; its authoritative and advising tone was masked by a sense of confidentiality with the addition of the first person, "I,"
and the second person, "you." Manipulation and fear tactics
were not the only methods of making Operation "Lifesaver" appeal to the Calgary resident; constructive imagery was equally important. Civil defence had to be driven by more than fear -it had to appear attractive to the civilian.
The planning procedures for Operation "Lifesaver" were elaborate in their attempts to maintain an element of surprise for the participants and also to achieve a level of safe control signs, auxiliary police and civil defence personnel identification and also the power of the civil defence auxiliary police; "Return,"
the timing and the road signs for the route back, and where the evacuees should go upon their arrival in Calgary; and, finally, " Trial run." 27 Following these topics was a discussion regarding the plan to close the highways leaving Calgary for the amount of time it took for evacuees to leave the city. Mixed with this effort to maintain order in a potentially chaotic situation was the desire for an element of reality and surprise, which turned out to be more artificial than anything else:
It was agreed that in order to maintain the element of surprise for the evacuees that the public be informed by means of press and radio, by the Dept. of Highways, that the highways being used for the evacuation would be subject to closure in sections for periods up to three hours (this period may be four hours, but the actual length of time will be worked out) during the time 1000 to 2000 hours on the 21 st of
September.
28
The committee also discussed the waves of civilian departures from the city according to the destinations' distances:
Sgt. Cunningham stated that the RCMP would be pulling in their people from all over the province for traffic control duties during the exercise and that with the assistance given by Western Command he saw no difficulty whatsoever in traffic control. To facilitate the movement of motor traffic taking part in this exercise, it will be necessary to close certain Sections of the Highways mentioned hereunder for periods of about 2 to 3 hours at some time between 1000 hrs. and 1700 hrs. on Wednesday, 21 st September, 1955.
[…] The closure will affect all traffic on these highways moving in the direction of Calgary and it will be imposed in the Sections concerned without further notice.
30
Blocked traffic and controlled routes were features of peacetime;
neither of these aspects would occur in the event of an actual evacuation. But then, this was not an actual evacuation.
A level of communication between planner and evacuee was integral for a successful execution of Operation "Lifesaver."
The signs colour-coding the escape routes provided were also a subject hotly discussed by planners:
It was, you will recollect, agreed that the signs should be 8 feet x 4 feet, white background, with black lettering in the top half and the route colouring in the bottom half. 
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Report on Operation Lifesaver, "Appendix," 27.
The report did not fully discus whether or not the signs were to remain on the roads following the practice in preparation for an actual attack or, for that matter, what would be done with them following the experiment. Nor was there any apparent fear of enemy infiltration into the civilian escape plan. The primary concern of planners appeared to be nothing more than the efficiency of providing the participant of the exercise with a clear portrayal of an escape route.
Image:
Image […] I feel that a shoulder title simply indicating 'Canadian Civil Defence' would lack everything required to fire local imagination. I feel that the combination set out above, showing that the wearer belongs to the Calgary unit of the Alberta Corps of Canadian Civil Defence will go a long way towards building up an esprit de corps which we shall want to
establish. It will also make it easy for re-enforcement to be readily identified.
34
Civil defence in this case was more of a pre-war operation rather than one concerning post-war disaster. The insignia's importance was not so much for identification of the officer in the chaos of a post-attack city, but the identification of Calgary's readiness for a post-attack situation. The crest was to attract the public's attention, to create an awareness of the force and power of civil defence in Calgary, and the city's progressive movement towards a united operation.
A couple months later on May 9, Bell wrote to Howsam again, this time expressing his desire to have the civil defence officer uniforms sooner than September. Bell wanted the uniforms to appear as a contingent in the Calgary Stampede procession which would take place in July:
My Controllers and I feel this is an opportunity not to be missed, this year, of showing a live Civil Defence organization off to thousands of people, from Calgary and elsewhere, who will be lining the route, but it means that a decision on the question of badges MUST now reach me without delay.
35
The element of civic pride in the civil defence preparations in Calgary was accentuated by a June 14 letter to Howsam from another organizer by the name of A. Pert. Pert's letter regarded the influx of local auxiliary civil defence police which would be recruited and trained for the September exercise. His letter 34 Bell, letter to G.R. Howsam, March 14, 1955 , acc. no. 76.428, PAA. 35 Bell, letter, May 9, 1955 addressed the urgent need and importance of the availability, and production, of 150 civil defence uniforms. Once again, the importance of the uniforms was based on image and the symbol of civic might, rather than their utility for the pending attack:
It appears to be generally considered that these men who are giving their time and a good deal of interest to training for this work, feel that a distinctive and suitable police uniform will be necessary if they are to operate efficiently. It is also suggested that without such a uniform it will be very difficult to maintain the interest and co-operation of these people. The re-establishment of the familiar, "the reidentification of individuals as people and as social roles, and the early reconstruction of basic social groupings (e.g., the family, the work group) are essential features for the process of recovery."
38
In times of stress, Tyhurst continued, institutional symbols assume "added meaning:"
One should recognize the communication value of the first-aid sign, the badge, the armband, the uniform, and the red-cross. Such symbols have very strong connotations, should not be used indiscriminately but strategically to ensure their maximum effect for information and reassurance.
39
The question remains, however, would the wounded civilian really care whether he or she was being aided by a Civil Defence officer of Canada, or of Alberta, or of Calgary? The significance of the badge in this case, remained in the pre-war phase which held civil defence as a symbol of civic strength, rather than of helpful communication in the chaotic aftermath of a nuclear attack.
Publicity:
Publicity was also particularly important to the meaning of Operation "Lifesaver."
The official Operation "Lifesaver" 
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emphasized the importance of communications and technology on the overall effect of the study:
Interest in Civil Defence was greatly stimulated in Alberta due to the preparations for and during the actual Exercise. For this we must give great credit to the press, radio and TV companies and their representatives. They were generous in their assistance with publicity, and the reporting and recording by their representatives showed a wellinformed knowledge of Civil Defence which resulted in accurate and instructive publicity. presented the exercise in a heroic fashion, adding a sense of drama with the incidental music which played throughout the program.
The documentary followed the events of the practice from the initial alarm, to the journey out of the city, to the lunch for evacuees in the receiving communities, and, finally, the return home.
This course of events was followed through a specific but anonymous family: it first showed the housewife of the family in the suburban kitchen hearing the civil defence warning via the radio, then her children running home from school, and finally her husband leaving his job in town for home. The documentary showed the process of emptying the city and the work of programmers at the civil defence control centre in Calgary. The receiving communities were portrayed as welcoming and cheerful towns with groups of friendly volunteers providing a warm lunch for the "refugees." The documentary noted that "[t]hough the weather was chilly, it was dry and most evacuees enjoyed their day in the country." 42 In addition to stressing the positive aspects of the practice, the CBC program accentuated the importance of the exercise with the exuberant ending statement: "Operation 'Lifesaver' has set the pattern for Canadian civil defence. War may never come, but if it does it will be a city with a plan whose citizens will survive." 43 The announcer also noted that Operation "Lifesaver" was a controlled practice but that, "if the real thing ever comes, people will remember the practice and follow the routine." 44 The documentary provided the general intent of the experiment: to achieve attention, not to create awareness. In this way, publicity was a primary component of Operation "Lifesaver."
The ACDHQ Operation "Lifesaver" report detailed the course of the civil defence practice. In many ways, the ACDHQ report was a manner of scrap book: it included responses to the course of events by the main programmers, timetables, maps of
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Calgary and of the surrounding and participating communities, and the various documents issued to the public concerning the practice. The report, however, contained no photographs of the exercise nor of any other aspect of Operation "Lifesaver," with the exception of an aerial photograph of Calgary taken the morning of September 28, 1955. The physical attributes of the practice were converted into a theatrical response to the perceived nuclear threat. The report, with its lack of photographic evidence of the events which took place on September 28, was no more real than many of the presupposed events found in civil defence handbooks and government reports concerning postwar reconstruction activities. In this way, the report could be considered a contrived representation of an apparently realistic event.
The official report portrayed Operation "Lifesaver" as a satisfactory success:
Exercise "Lifesaver" was of great value. Despite the difficulties and the disappointments -and there were many -it paid valuable dividends. For example the existing civil defence organization was given a good test, and its strength and weakness under operational conditions were brought out. Also it provided practical field training at all levels of government, and created new interest in civil defence both in rural and civic areas by giving the people a definite job to do. observational methods of research, the Operation "Lifesaver" experiment was subject to bias. Reports following the exercise, in the ACDHQ booklet, in the newspaper, and in civil defence newsletters, emphasized the cooperation of civilians, and their eagerness to join in the activities:
Most evacuees displayed keenness and enthusiasm for the Exercise. Of those questioned none voiced any complaint regarding expense, encroachment on their leisure or leaving their homes unoccupied.
The attitude of those who refused to take part in the Exercise was disinterest, disbelief, or distrust in the Exercise, and cynicism, or they offered some excuse that the Exercise did not concern them. The attitude of pedestrians who walked to assembly points was excellent."
46
The exercise apparently achieved the purpose of the project, which was detailed at the beginning of the report:
Operation "Lifesaver" was a co-operative civil defence project between federal, provincial and municipal authorities and was designed to ascertain some of the problems that would be faced by cities such as Calgary when evacuating large groups of people from a threatened area. The exercise was also designed to test civil defence organization and training in many of its branches, at the provincial, C.M. A.A. and municipal levels. 47 By focussing on the exercise's success and significance to the world of civil defence, the report maintained the enthusiasm that Small town after small town reported disappointing numbers of evacuees. In Innisfail 336 people out of 84 cars showed up, out of an expected 3,500. "I think our 218 workers would be a lot happier … if more evacuees had shown up," said Frank Churchill, chairperson of the civil defence committee. Ibid, 19. 49 Ibid. 50 Richmond and Villemaire, 95. government lay within these optimistic reflections. Hints of the worries concerning civilian participation were evident in reports in that they were mentioned but quickly discarded. In the CBC documentary, for instance, the announcer noted the level of nonparticipants in the project, commenting that some did not take part on account of highway conditions while others were out of town for the day. He continued on to say, however, that regardless, those who participated in the exercise were enough to make the project worthwhile. Another segment of the CBC coverage featured police officers surveying the deserted streets: This in itself emphasized two points. Firstly, in any evacuation plan we must take into consideration the possibility of abnormal weather conditions existing at the time the plan is put into operation. Secondly, plans must be sufficiently flexible to allow the use of alternate roads and highways.
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This statement reinforced the prevailing desire to not include the public in any possibility of risk, thus maintaining complete control over the situation, converting potential chaos into calculated reason. Operation "Lifesaver" catered to the desires of both the civilians and the planners. For civilians, the exercise proved that in the event of attack escape and survival was possible -the individual was in charge of his or her fate. For planners, the exercise was portrayed as a success and, despite the poor turn-out, the events went as anticipated.
Concl usion:
57 Report on Operation Lifesaver, 13.
Operation "Lifesaver" was an illustrated product of early Cold 
